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CHAPTER 6 
Modernity and the Satanic Face of God 
MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J. 
The religious intellect must recognize that in the nineteenth century it confronts 
a unique situation, unprecedented both in the depth of its challenge and in the 
extension of its claims. During that period, the denial of the reality of God rose 
to achieve an articulate and influential presence within the intellectual culture 
of western Europe. This denial was no longer the persuasion of this or that 
idiosyncratic figure such as Diagoras of Melos or Theodore of Cyrene in pre-
Christian antiquity; nor did it constitute the mentality of a peculiarly 
enlightened cast such as the d'Holbachian circle in Paris in the eighteenth 
century. During the nineteenth century, "the eclipse of God" advanced much 
farther, descending massively upon modernity and upon the world that it 
embraced as non-European nations fell under the influence of Western thought. 
This eclipse circumscribed an absence of religious faith or of any living theistic 
affirmation, together with an attendant sense of alienation, indifference, or 
hostility toward religious doctrines, presence, and institutions. This atheism or 
secularism or agnosticism together with its cognate indifference or contempt 
for the religious was unique within the history of the world in the public 
acceptance it secured during that century, in the ascendancy within particular 
subcultures it gained, and in the rapidity of increase it enjoyed among intellec-
tuals and the formative sources of culture. It came to shadow all ranks of society 
in Europe, from workers to bourgeoisie to intellectuals, gathering strength to 
spill into the twentieth century with an ideational force unmatched since the 
Protestant Reformation. 
During this steady devolution of religious affirmation, not only did the 
judgment about the validity of religious belief fall under suspicion and question, 
but the nature or content of religious ideas themselves did as well. The religious 
culture of Europe was being reconfigured because the notion of "God" was 
being reconfigured. God was coming to be seen now as the alienation of the 
100 
Modernity and the Satanic Face of God 101 
human species in favor of an imaginary subject or as the structure of the human 
society now writ large or as the projection out of fear and longing of oedipal 
necessities. Each of these reconfigurations lent new shapes to political economy 
or theology, literature, philosophy, and rhetoric. Emerging as the psychological 
dynamic that explained religious ideas were such terms as Vergegensti:indlichung 
and Enti:iusserung, objectification and alienation, and the face of God changed, 
as in some way the hermeneutics of suspicion registered the human interests 
that had created it. 1 
But there was another, very different historical development in modern-
ity's disclosure of the profound projection within religious belief. The initial 
grammars of religion revealed that the human was the truth of the divine. The 
second wave of interpretation would tear off this mask and see beneath it not 
the human but the antihuman. God is revealed as - to borrow a term from 
Spanish mysticism - el enemigo de natura humana, the enemy of human na-
ture. The discovery of this equation between the divine and the diabolical was 
both the product of the nineteenth century and one of the fundamental reversals 
of the sacred in the history of religion. This discovery the following essay 
attempts to outline in a series of very broad brush strokes. To do so, it proposes: 
(1) to indicate something of the dialectic that lies at the origins of modern 
atheism, the paradoxical sources of modern atheism;2 (2) to examine the radical 
shift in fundamental thinking that took place in the nineteenth century- in 
what Hobbes called the "First Grounds of Philosophy"; (3) to trace the effect 
that this produced in the basic evidence advanced for the reality of God; ( 4) to 
outline some classic moments in the massive rise in atheistic consciousness that 
these philosophical and theological arguments dialectically occasioned; (5) to 
identify the "god" that emerges from these counterpositions. 
I . See Michael J. Buckley, "Atheism and Contemplation;' Theological Studies 40 ( 1979): 
680-99. Eugene Kamenka maintains that "the psychological use of the word 'projection' in 
English originated in George Eliot's translation of the Essence of Christianity. She used it to 
render Feuerbach's (Hegelian) terms Vergegenstandlichung (objectification, reification) and 
Enti:iusserung (alienation)." See Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 167 n. 43. It should be noted, however, that Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, some ten years before Eliot's translation, makes the world "a projection of 
God in the unconscious ," and consequently it is "to us, the present expositor of the divine 
mind." Nature, in The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks 
Atkinson (New York: Random House, 1940), vol. 7, p. 36. 
2. I have elsewhere suggested this pattern of internal contradiction at the origins of 
modern atheism and would like in this paper to follow it as it was transposed in the nineteenth 
century, the golden age of atheism. Cf. Michael J. Buckley, S.J., At the Origins of Modern 
Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, I 990). This initial section is little more than a 
precis of the findings of that work. For a brilliant and incisive cultural critique of the project 
and of the revolution that was modernity, see Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay 
in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
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I. At the Origins 
The ideational origins of modern atheism lie remarkably with the strategies 
employed against it. It was generated and shaped by the attempt to provide for 
the affirmation of the existence of God by using the new sciences as the fun-
damental and irrefragable basis for such an affirmation. Thus Isaac Newton 
maintained that the "main Business of natural Philosophy is to argue from 
Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects, 
till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical."3 By the 
beginnings of the eighteenth century, design in nature furnished the compre-
hensive warrant for the illation to the affirmation of God. Only a divine cause 
could account for design in the universe, from the solar system to the structure 
of organic bodies. The inference from design to designer would serve as the 
principal foundation for later discussions of the divine nature, moral theology, 
and the possibility of divine revelation. Hundreds of studies came out under 
the inspiration of so great a genius as Newton, physico-theologies giving the 
grounding for the assertions of God by arguing from design in nature. Theo-
logians were generally enthusiastic. 
But few noticed what such an approach omitted. It bracketed all religious 
experience as cognitively irrelevant, as implicitly empty. While it formulated a 
"natural theology" that found patterns in the physical universe and then argued 
to a supreme geometer/architect/nav-toxpa-crop - to omnipotent intelligence 
and power - it found nothing in the history of the human involvement with 
God in Christianity or Judaism that bore seriously upon this issue. The single 
phrase that captures the great enterprise ::md influence of Isaac Newton was 
"universal mechanics," a mechanics that provided not only the foundations of 
mathematics, but the rational basis for all theology and religion. Such a universal 
mechanics, Newton argued, while all-embracing, must have principles or war-
ranted sources of explanation that were finally not mechanical. 
Superseded by this universal mechanics was the attempt of some sixty 
years before to provide a rational basis for religion. Descartes, followed by 
Malebranche, had formulated a first philosophy that found the warrant for God 
in the content of ideas that confronted the thinking subject. For Descartes, 
mechanics was a limited, not a universal, discipline, and everything it studied 
was to be explained by only mechanical principles. He had saved mechanics 
from theology by laying the grounds for the affirmation of the existence of God 
in a first philosophy that was not mechanics, but an independent metaphysics. 
Thus the disciplines were distinct and mechanics was limited, but it was auton-
omous. 
3. Isaac Newton, Optics, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Influctions, and 
Colours of Light, ed. Duane H. D. Roller (New York: Dover, 1952), Query 28, p. 369. 
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what one must understand "before" - as the grounding for all other disciplined 
inquiry- although one often comes upon that "before" long after other dis-
ciplines have been pursued. One often comes upon the first last.4 In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, the focus of fundamental thinking was on the 
reality that confronted or surrounded the thinking subject, whether as the 
content of ideas as with Descartes or all the phenomena of the physical universe. 
Thus Thomas Hobbes, from that intellectual era, would insist that "The First 
Grounds of Philosophy" must deal directly with the physical universe and so 
combine the geometry that studied simply the motion of things, as in Galileo's 
mechanics , and the physics that bore upon the general properti es of bodies. 
After this foundation is laid in a grasp of the nature of things, one can go on 
to study the human person and political society or the state. 
II. The Shift in Fundamental Thinking 
In the writings, the enormously influential writings, of John Locke, one can find 
the beginnings of an intellectual revolution against this priority of investigation 
into the natu re of things or into the Cartesian content of ideas. With Locke, a sea 
change began in fundamental thinking. One has only to open to Locke's "Epistle 
to the Reader;' the preface to his masterpiece, An Essay concerning Human Under-
standing. This "Epistle" was necessary, thought Locke, to understand how the essay 
itself came about. Many before and after Locke had embarked upon a similar 
journey in inquiry. But Locke made the understanding of understanding the 
foundation of all exploration and inquiry. A turn to the subject had already been 
initiated by Descartes, but he grounded his first philosophy not upon the processes 
of understanding, but upon the content of ideas. In contrast, Locke would study 
the processes themselves. Richard Rorty has noted quite correctly: "We owe the 
notion of a ' theory of knowledge' based on an understanding of 'mental processes' 
to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke."5 The necessity that an analysis 
4. The concept of "fundamental thinking" is derived from Richard McKeon's formu-
lation and use of "genera l selection charac teristics of the phi losophic comm uni cation of a 
period" as well as from the dist inctions that he drew within general selection and brought 
to bear so perceptively upon the histo ry of thought. See Richard P. McKeon, "Philosophic 
Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry," in Freedom and History and Other Essays: An In troduction 
to the Thought of Richard McKean, ed. Zah ava K. McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1990), pp. 251-52. 
5. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univers ity 
Press, I 980), p. 3. Rorty distinguishes Locke's co ntribution from that of Descartes: "We owe 
the notion of ' the mind ' as a separate entity in wh ich 'processes' occur to the same period, 
and especia lly to Descar tes" (pp. 3-4). 
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of the processes of thought form the prior foundation for statements about the 
processes of things distinguishes John Locke: 
Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee 
that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject 
very remote from this [ the principles of morality and revealed religion], found 
themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After 
we had awhile puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution 
of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts that we took 
a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that 
Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects 
our Understandings were, or were not fitted to dea l with. This I proposed to 
the Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this 
should be our first Enquiry.6 
This is very different " fundamental thinking" from that found in Des-
cartes or Newto n or Hobbes. In the early months of 1671 , during these 
important conversations at Exeter House, Locke was transferring the focus of 
foundational thought from the exploration of that which confronts the think-
ing subject - such as issues about "the principles of morality and revealed 
religion" - to the processes of thinking themselves. 7 The "Epistle to the 
Reader" insisted upon an antecedent epistemological foundation, upon a con-
sideration of the potentialities for human knowing and their commensurate 
"objects," before attempting to deal with problems that immediately touch the 
nature of things. "First inquiry" should be epistemological. What Locke mod-
estly "proposed to the Company, who all readily assented" in the country home 
of Lord Ashley, soon to be first earl of Shaftesbury, was actually a sweeping 
change within modernity. 
The emphasis that Locke gave to the processes of thought gathered force 
in the years that followed and ran full steam into the works and subsequent 
influence of Immanuel Kant. His three Critiques were to transpose all funda-
mental reflection into this new key: "I do not mean by this a critique of books 
and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge 
after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide 
as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general."8 Before one 
6. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), "Ep istle to the Reader," p. 7 (emphasis added). 
7. One of these friends, James Tyrrell , records in the marginalia he appended to his 
copy of the essay that the conversation had been "about the principles of morality and 
revealed religion." For this , as also for the dating and location of these co nversa tions, see 
Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 140-41. 
8. lmmanuel Kant, Critiq ue of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Norma n Kemp Smith 
(London: Macmillan, 1963), "Preface to First Edition," p. 9. 
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launches into metaphysics or natural theology or universal mechanics, one must 
analyze the knowing of the knower to determine what could be known; other-
wise human inquiry yielded only transcendental illusion. Before one explores 
morality and ethics, one must analyze the practical intellect or Wille and the 
human ability to determine itself freely to choose. Before one deals with the 
beautiful and the sublime, with taste and genius, one must understand the 
reflexivity or harmony that is possible between the imagination in its represen-
tations and the understanding in its judgment. Again, Kant did not originate 
this flood; he augmented and sanctioned it for the century that was to follow. 
Under his blessings, these waters became holy. Disciplines bearing such names 
as epistemology or criticism or phenomenologies of spirit or cognitional theory 
became foundational in nineteenth-century modernity. One had to look at 
human capacities, at the various potentialities for knowledge and choice and 
even taste, in order to determine what the proper objects of these potentialities 
are. When this was established, one could bring these powers to bear upon 
questions of inquiry and decision without the dangers of irresolvable contra-
diction and conflicts. One must gauge the human first. 
The foundational importance of the self-appropriation of the knowing 
subject carried persuasion also in theology, entering emphatically into the in-
quiries of the greatest Protestant theologian of the nineteenth century, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. Here one finds a primordial dependence of all discussion of 
theological subjects or the propositions of religion upon the prior assessment 
of immediate consciousness, variously formulated as either the feeling and 
intuition of the infinite or the feeling of absolute dependence. 
Kant and Schleiermacher, as Fred Lawrence has so well maintained, rep-
resent two distinctly different kinds of foundational consciousness.9 Kant 
tethered reason, understanding, or judgment to consciousness as a perception 
of objects; like Rousseau, Schleiermacher rooted them in the perception of 
feelings, the feeling of feeling, that he sometimes referred to as "sentiment." 
What Kant was for philosophy, Schleiermacher was for theology. Both gave a 
foundational priority to human subjectivity- not in the sense of an arbitrary 
imposition of meanings, but in the sense of the subject as agent, possessing its 
own internal structure of mind or spirit, whose capacities must be determined 
as the fundamental security for subsequent affirmations. For both, the human 
subject came first; the human subject would measure the things that it would 
engage. Not nature, but human nature had become fundamental. 
9. Fred Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern 
Concern for the Other," Theological Studies 54 (1993): 58-62. 
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III. Theistic Argumentation in a New Key 
As this revolution swept through modernity, Kant and Schleiermacher trans-
posed the arguments for the reality of God into a new key. They formulated 
disciplines for so much of the philosophy and theology that would follow them, 
disciplines that were to shift the issue of God to human subjectivity for its 
fundamental point of departure. Kant provided critiques, while Schleiermacher 
explored "religion." In both God emerged as a necessity to deal with human life 
and experience. God was an entailment of the human. 
The Critique of Practical Reason laid the foundation for ethical reasoning 
and for the metaphysics of morals in the centrality of human freedom. The 
living of a human life, the entire ethical enterprise, presupposed human nature 
as free. Freedom - which was to dominate the nineteenth century's inquiries 
into the human - identified with the subjectivity that was human nature and 
was itself the originator of the moral life: 
By "nature of man" we here intend only the subjective ground of the exercise 
(under objective moral laws) of man's freedom in general; this ground -
whatever is its character - is the necessary antecedent of every act apparent 
to the senses. But this subjective ground, again, must itself always be an 
expression of freedom (for otherwise, the use or abuse of man's power of 
choice [ Willkiir] in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him 
nor could the good or bad in him be called moral). Hence the source of evil 
cannot lie in an object determining the will [ Willkiir] through inclination, 
nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in a rule made by the will [ Willkiir] 
for the use of its freedom, i.e. in a maxim. 10 
Freedom in Kant is both potency and act. It is the transcendental power 
to choose, the independence of Willkiir from determination by external objects 
and by the impulses of past or present. It is the reflexive self-legislation of 
Willkiir, shown in its selection of maxims by which to govern its exercise and 
in its selection of objects upon which its actions will devolve. One is free in 
transcendental freedom because one is one's own master, coerced in the process 
of choice by no external master. Secondly, freedom is also actualization or 
autonomy. Autonomy occurs when one chooses in accordance with the univer-
sal law, living free from external determination and realizing in actuality the 
moral potentiality of the human. Heteronomy occurs when one renounces one's 
power as a free being by choosing to act dependently upon the determinations 
of desires. In this sense, human life is the movement from freedom to freedom, 
l 0. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodo re M. 
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson , with a new essay by John R. Silber (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1960), bk. I, pp. 16-17. 
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the freedom of Willkiir to the freedom of autonomy, the freedom of potentiality 
to the freedom of actuality, and the path to this freedom of autonomy consti-
tutes the ethical enterprise its elf. 11 
For the internal coherence of human freedom, i.e., for human life to make 
sense morally, one must postulate the existence of God. The austere ethical 
imperative is to do one's duty, and duty dictates that one strive for the highest 
human good. This object conjoins virtue (dictated by duty) and happiness 
(which objectively ought to be united with virtue). The virtuous deserve to be 
happy. If this highest human good is imperative, it must be possible, and for 
this "possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent 
Being which alone can unite the two elements of this highest good." 12 Without 
God, the ethical or moral life is a movement into absurdity. One would be 
morally commanded or directed toward the impossible, toward a conjunction 
of happiness and virtue that only happenstance effects in human life - and 
even this rarely. Morality is only rationally coherent if the object of morality is 
itself seriously possible. Thus what human beings cannot effect must be within 
the power of another. There must be that omnipotent intelligence that can make 
possible the object of command, the "highest good." "Morality thus leads in-
eluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful 
moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of 
creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end." 13 In 
this way, God alone makes rational morality possible for human beings, and 
Jesus Christ is the exemplification of this morality. 
For Schleiermacher, "religion" becomes the foundation for dogmatics and 
indeed for his greatest work, Die Glaubenslehre, and the basis of all religion is 
the consciousness of the infinite, or what in his more mature work he would 
call "the feeling of absolute dependence:' Kant had deliberately excluded expe-
rience from the exercise of human freedom because "the philosopher, as teacher 
of pure reason (from unassisted principles a priori [in ethics]), must confine 
himself within the narrower circle, and, in so doing, must abstract from all 
experience." 14 For Schleiermacher, there is no parallel refusal of experience in 
11. See John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," introduction to 
Kant, Religion, pp. Lxxx-xcvi. 
12. Kant, Religion, "Preface to the First Edition," pp. 4-5. 
13. Kant, Religion, " Preface," pp. 5-6. The classic treatment of the existence of God as 
a postulate of pure practical reason is, of course, in book II of Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason, chapter 5, "The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason." See 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1956), pp. 128-36. 
14. Kant, Religion, p. 11. Th is translation has been modified, since the German reads: 
" ... von alJer Erfahrung abstrahieren mu£ .... " Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der bloflen Vernunft, ed. Karl Vorlander (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. 13. 
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favor of illation. On the contrary, one appeals to the fundamental experience 
that underlies all inference and even differentiated thought. Whether that im-
mediacy be termed " intuition" or "feeling," it denotes a fundamental awareness, 
a self-consciousness given in every act of cognition. Now this self-consciousness 
is inseparable from God-consciousness - as doubt in Descartes is inseparable 
from existence: 
To feel oneself absolutely dependent and to be conscious of being in relation 
with God are one and the same thing; and the reason is that absolute depen-
dence is the fundamental relation which must include all others in itself. This 
last expression includes the God-consciousness in the human self-conscious-
ness in such a way that, quite in accordance with the above analysis, the two 
cannot be separated from each other. . .. God is given to us in feeling in an 
original way. 15 
God is an illation of ethics in Kant, making duty's object, the highest good, 
seriously possible; God is a given of the primordial experience of self-conscious-
ness in Schlei~rmacher. 
Through the influence of both thinkers, a critically important shift was 
taking place in modernity that would resituate fundamental thinking about the 
divine reality, a shift that Tennyson would both celebrate in In Memoriam and 
comment upon at the end of his life. He saw that the heady days of the religious 
use of nature were passing, or at least diminishing. Charles Lyell's Principles of 
Geology (1830-33 ), with its demonstrations of the great age of the earth and 
the successive and massive extinction of species, had left "Nature red in tooth 
and claw/ With ravine." Tennyson found that nature "shriek'd against his creed;' 
leaving those who depended upon Nature's witness convinced that they must 
regard "life as futile, then, as frail." 16 The nineteenth-century thinker must turn 
elsewhere: 
Yet God is love, transcendent, all-pervading! We do not get this faith from 
Nature or the world. If we look at Nature alone, full of perfection and 
imperfection, she tells us that God is disease, murder and rapi ne. We get this 
faith from ourselves, from what is highest within us, which recognizes that 
there is not one fruitless pang, just as there is not one lost good.'7 
15. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. MacIntosh and J. S. Stewart 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), introduction, n. 4, p. 17 (emphasis added). 
16. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Tennyson: In Memoriam, ed. Susan Shatto and Marian Shaw 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), section 56, lines 15- 16, 25, p. 80. 
17. This remark is cited by his son and introduced with the remark: "After one of these 
moods in the summer of 1892, he [Tennyson] exclaimed .... " See Hallam, Lord Tennyson, 
Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir (New York: Macmillan, 1897), as cited in Alfred, Lord 
Tennyson, In Memoriam, ed. Robert H. Ross (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 119. For the 
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"This faith from ourselves, from what is highest within us .... " Nature, 
for all the physics and universal mechanics it evokes, stills carries its history of 
destruction and deaths . It cannot establish the warrant for the existence of God. 
One must rather go to the inferences entailed by the critique of practical reason 
or to the experience fundamental to religion. For all of their contrasts and even 
contradictory procedures, what both critique and the analysis of religion have 
in common is what they both take as foundational: the radically human - in 
contradistinction with subhuman nature. The Kantian critique recognized that 
ethics engages an (ICtivity that is uniquely human, the way human beings should 
decide and act and live; Schleiermacher saw that human passivity is engaged by 
religion, the manner of human experience, preconceptual "feelings," change 
worked by the influence of an object, which reveals its existence to one in the 
inner consciousness. 
The same is true for religion. The same actions of the universe through which 
it reveals itself to you in the finite also bring it into a new relationship to your 
mind and your condition; in the act of intuiting it, you must necessarily be 
seized by various feelings. In religion, however, a different and stronger rela-
tionship between intuition and feeling takes place, and intuition never pre-
dominates so much that feeling is almost extinguished. 
On the contrary, is it really a miracle if the eternal world affects the senses 
of our spirit as the sun affects our eyes? Is it a miracle when the sun so blinds 
us that everything else disappears, not only at that moment, but even long 
afterward all objects we observe are imprinted with its image and bathed in 
its brilliance? Just as the particular manner in which the universe presents 
itself to you in your intuitions and determines the uniqueness of your in-
dividual religion, so the strength of these feelings determines the degree of 
religiousness. 18 
Nature does not provide the warrant for God; the warrant for God is found in 
human nature, either active in its choices or passive in its immediate experience 
or feeling. 
So profound and pervasive is this shift to human nature as foundational 
for dealing with the reality of God that both Kant and Schleiermacher can cite 
it as the linchpin of their fundamental works. Kant's four books on religion 
become the study of human nature: 
influence of Charles Lyell 's Principles of Geology (1830-33 ) and its demonstrations of the 
great age of the earth and the successive extinction of species, see Eleanor D. Mattes, In 
Memoriam: Th e Way of a Soul (New York: Exposition Press, 1951 ), pp. 55-61, 73-86, 111-25, 
as excerpted in Alfred, Lord Tennyson, ed. Ross, pp. 120ff. 
18. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. 
Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Speech II, pp. 109-10. 
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In order to make apparent the relation of religion to human nature ( endowed 
in part with good, in part with evil predispositions), I represent, in the four 
following essays, the relationship of the good and evil principles as that of 
the two self-subsistent active causes influencing men. 19 
The purpose of Schleiermacher's Reden is stated: "I wish to lead you to the 
innermost depths from which religion first addresses the mind. I wish to show 
you from what capacity of humanity religion proceeds, and how it belongs to 
what is for you the highest and dearest." Precisely for its engagement of the 
human in such depths, this inquiry is not for all, maintains Schleiermacher, but 
only for "you" who are capable of "raising yourselves above the common stand-
point of humanity, you who do not shrink from the burdensome way into the 
depths of human nature in order to find the ground of its actions and 
thought."20 
And how does one move "into the depths of human nature"? Through 
the differentiation among three disciplines and the recognition and prosecution 
of religion as one of them. For metaphysics finds its essence in thinking; moral-
ity, in acting and doing; but religion, in intuition and feeling. In Schleiermacher, 
God emerges as the active source of these feelings; God is even given a nominal 
definition in terms of the feeling of absolute dependence: "the Whence of our 
receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be 
designated by the word 'God,' and that this is for us the really original signifi-
cation of that word."21 The original human awareness of God is simply of that 
which is the codeterminant in this feeling. Thus to feel oneself absolutely 
dependent and to be conscious of being in relation to God is one and the same 
thing. In this sense, God is given to immediate human awareness, i.e., in feeling, 
in "an original way." Indeed, this can be recognized as "an original revelation 
of God to man or in man."22 
One can only remark about the radical contrast this offers to the major 
and most influential thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
these previous centuries, heady with the emergence of the universal competence 
of the new mechanics, nature or design or the content of ideas or things had 
provided the evidence for asserting the divine existence. Now the battleground 
is confined to human nature and its entailments. This recasting of the founda-
tions of religion provides the theological point of departure for the nineteenth 
century: What is it to be human, and how does this warrant necessitate the 
affirmation or denial of God? 
19. Kant, Religion, p. 10. 
20. Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 87. 
21. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 16. 
22 . Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 17-18. 
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IV. The Humanistic Foundations of the Emergent Atheism 
The dialectical reversal of theistic positions that obtained in early modernity 
repeated itself analogously within the changed coordinates of the nineteenth 
century. In these earlier centuries, the strategies to rationalize the divine exis-
tence furnish the weapons to attack. The positive generated its own commensu-
rate self-contradiction. In the nineteenth century, philosophy and theology had 
moved to ground religious affirmation on the entailments of human nature; 
now they will be contradicted on the same ground in the struggle that Henri 
de Lubac so aptly called "the drama of atheistic humanism."23 
One must begin with the originating genius of this movement, Ludwig 
Feuerbach - a Bavarian theological student become philosopher under the 
instruction of Hegel, only to become atheist - the man whose writings were 
so successful, so influential that Marx saluted him as the great precursor of 
dialectical atheism and Freud held him as his favorite philosopher.24 Atheism 
came as the climax of his intellectual development, and he summarized the 
steps of his growth in this way: "God was my first thought; Reason my second; 
Man, my third and last thought."25 Respect for the character of nineteenth-
century fundamental thinking dictated that Feuerbach begin the Essence of 
Christianity with an analysis of the essential nature of the human person as 
self-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of species. He could deduce his conclu-
sions about the source and object of religion from the phenomenon that human 
beings have religion while brutes do not, and that this must derive from this 
species-consciousness. In his third edition he placed his central thesis at the 
very beginning: "The essence of the human being [self-consciousness] in dif-
ferentiation from the beasts is not only the ground or cause, but also the object 
of religion."26 The figure of God, the object of religion, is a projection of the 
human essence. God is the human writ large as species. 
Feuerbach argues to this cardinal fact of projection, that the true sense of 
23. Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheistic Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1950). 
24. See Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. vii-viii, 16, 27, 117-18; Peter 
Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 28-29, 532. On March 7, 1875, 
Freud wrote to Edward Silverstein: ''Among all philosophers, I worship and admire this man 
(Feuerbach) the most." See Gay, p. 28. 
25. Cited from Ludwig Feuerbach's Philosophical Fragments by Kamenka , p. 39. 
26. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ed. Werner Schuffenhauer, 3rd 
ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), p. 29 n. 3. This sentence appears in the third edition, 
done in 1849 while Feuerbach still lived. The celebrated English translation, The Essence of 
Christianity, trans. George Eliot from the 2nd rev. ed. of 1843 (New York: Harper, 1957), was 
first published in London in 1854. The German original of this addition to the third edition 
reads: "Das Wesen des Menschen im Unterschied vom Tiere ist nicht nur der Grund, sondern 
auch der Gegendstand der Religion." 
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theology is anthropology, from three dimensions of human nature: human 
consciousness, linguistic predication, and the history of human alienation -
consciousness, language, and history. 
( 1) The nature of human self-consciousness: the object that is essentially 
known reveals the subject to itself. When such an essential object does not have 
its independent existence guaranteed by sense perception, it is nothing more 
than the essential nature of the subject. (2) The essential humanity of the divine 
attributes - such as wise, blessed, provident: What is predicated of God is taken 
from human experience and is true of human beings alone. Now the truth of 
the subject is found in its predicates. Since the divine predicates are human, 
their subject is also human. (3) Commensurate alienation: what human beings 
ascribe to God has been historically subtracted or alienated from the human 
essence. One can trace this through the history of religions or theology. That 
God may be enriched as good and holy, the human person must be seen as 
poor and sinful. 27 
That such projection of the human into an alien subject should take place 
is to be understood as a stage in human self-appropriation through otherness. 
If one fixates at this stage, however, one formulates the illusions that are theol-
ogy. But the developments of cultural history have reached a time of further 
progress. Philosophy, now the interpreter of the truth of religion , is called to 
reappropriate these "divine" attributes for the human, to restore to human 
beings their grandeur. One does not eliminate the divine predicates, but only 
the imaginary divine subject of these attributes. The attributes are true not of 
this supernatural illusion, but of the human actuality. What is "God" in this 
state of illusion? The alienation of the human from itself: "a perversion, a 
distortion ; which, however, the more perverted and false it is, all the more 
appears to be profound."28 Feuerbach's inquiries mount what is basically a 
philosophical grammar in the medieval sense of "grammar" as a scientia inter-
pretandi or ars interpretandi, a science or a technique for the understanding of 
the meaning of fundamental symbols.29 
Karl Marx accepted Feuerbach's critique of religion, but modified it in 
two ways: he insisted upon the social-economic sources of the origin and 
fixation of this projection; and he rejected Feuerbach's strategy of reflexive 
assimilation or hermeneutical recognition in favor of the destructive and trans-
27. This is the burden of the initial chapter of The Essence of Christianity. These three 
basic argument are repea ted in Feuerbach's other works. See Feuerbach, The Essence of 
Christianity, pp. 1-32. 
28. Feuerbach, The Essence of Ch ristianity, p. 231. 
29. For the medieval sense of "grammar," see Michael J. Buckley, S.J., "Towards the 
Construction of Theology: A Response to Richard McKeon," Journal of Religion 58, Supple-
ment (1978): S58-S59, esp. n. 15. It was Rabanus Maurus who recaptured fo r the Middle 
Ages the defi ni tion of Marius Victorinus and brought it to bear upon the world of symbols. 
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formational activity of the "revolutionary principle." He changed Feuerbach's 
human person from a contemplative interpreter to a practical agent whose 
transitive activity is to change social structures. One does not simply interpret 
alienation; one destroys it - in the social order. Marx moved materialism from 
a reflexive principle to a revolutionary principle. This shift is what Marx refers 
to in his classic eleventh thesis against Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it:'30 
Grammar was not enough, and if grammar was the discipline most analogous 
to Feuerbach's enterprise, rhetoric seems most apt for Marx. 
The human being is sensuous and practical, and for this emphasis Marx 
changes the meaning of this last term, collapsing the distinction between Aris-
totle's 1tpal;tc; and 1toC:XytTJcrtc; - so that "practical" now contains the "poetic" 
activity that creates a new world. The human being is not an abstract essence, 
but economic and social and essentially called to a much greater factive activity 
than Feuerbach understood. The failure of Feuerbach's materialism was that it 
did not grasp human activity's. revolutionary and transitive (not contemplative) 
character, that it essentially passes into the external world and into the lives of 
other human beings, that it inescapably forms community, and that this prac-
tical activity constitutes all reality, all objects. 
Truth is not discovered; it is constituted by this activity. Human beings 
make their world true. Anything else is scholasticism! To realize this human 
dynamism in practice is to come into possession of one's humanity. This real-
ization of what it means to be human carries with it an enormous responsibility 
for the world and for the lot of human beings. The philosopher must not simply 
realize this alienation that religion entails, but must destroy it in its social and 
economic roots. "Once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the 
holy family, the former must then itself be criticized in theory and revolu-
tionized in practice."31 Religious critique has a priority over economics and 
politics; it is the presupposition of all other criticism. Marx's Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right insists that only this critique can restore 
the human essence to the human being, make the human being free enough to 
drive this criticism deeper into the criticism of right and of politics for "religion 
is only the illusory sun which revolves round man as long as he does not revolve 
round himself:'32 Hence to restore the revolutionary principle to the human 
30. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach;' in Marx and Engels on Religion, introduction 
by Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 72 (emphasis added). 
31. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Thesis no. 4, p. 70. 
32. Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Marx and 
Engels on Religion, pp. 41-42. "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people 
is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about its condition 
is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusion. The criticism of religion is therefore 
in embryo the criticism of the vale of woe, the halo of which is religion" (p. 42). 
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means a critique of fundam ental human ali enation, religion, and only " the 
criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest essence for 
man, hence with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man 
is debased , enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence."33 
In a stunning reversal of Kant and Schleiermacher, God is now the one 
who alienates men and women fro m their humanity, both speculatively as in 
Feuerbach and ideologically in the economic and social structure in which 
human beings live. It is no t eth ics that God makes poss ible; it is ali enation and 
exploitation. 
Marx had reali zed this as ea rly as his doctora l dissertation . Long before 
he elaborated a d ialectica l humanism, he had abridged and made his own the 
words of Prometheus fro m Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound (I. 975): "i:x'J\ rrAw 
Aoyw, 1:0u<; rrcxvrnu<; £X0mpw ernu <;." Pro metheus beco_mes the hero of philos-
ophy, and his declaratio n is truncated by Marx to become the maxi m for 
humanity and the miss ion of philosophy. Philosophy must take from Pro me-
theus "its own m otto agai nst all gods, heavenly and ea rthly, who do not ac-
knowledge the conscio usness of man as the supreme divin ity."34 Human con-
sciousness, still the foc us of fundamental thinking, was not to yield abso lute 
dependence, but in sharp contrast its own absolute supremacy. Even as ea rly as 
March of 184 1, God was posed as the antithesis - not the support or engage-
ment - of a free human life. 
It is cr itically important to see that the destructio n o f belief in God became 
fo r Marx an ethical imperative - no t simply a political or social stra tegy. Marx 
even employs Kant's vocabulary: this destruction is a "categorical imperative ."35 
Religious thinkers can never understand th e character of authentic Marxism 
unless they understand this profoundly moral commitment, as if to the stamp-
ing out of a virulent disease. Marx's is one of the earli est expressions of this 
hatred fo r the person of God, fo und in his dissertation with its apotheosis of 
the perso n of Prometheus.36 What Chri st is to Kant, Prometheus is to Marx: 
the embodiment of a mo rally developed humanity. With the Prometheus of 
33. Marx, Contribution, p. 50; emphasis in the or iginal. This project, the criticism of 
religion, contai ns the fundamental ca ll to be rad ical: "To be rad ical is to grasp the root of 
the ma tter. But for ma n the ropt is man h imself. The evident proof of the radical ism of 
Germa n theory, and hence of it's practical energy, is that it proceeds from a resolute positive 
abolition of religion." 
34. Ka rl Marx, The Difference between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the 
Natural Philosophy of Epicurus, "Forward to T hesis," in Marx and Engels 011 Religion, p. I 5. 
The fu ll sentence in Aeschylus reads: " In one word , I hate a ll the gods that rece ived good at 
my hand and with ill req ui te me wrongfully," as in the translation of Herbert Weir Smyth, 
Aeschylus, Loeb C lass ical Library (Cam bridge: Harva rd, 1973 ), p. 305. 
35. Marx, Contribution, p. 42. 
36. For an illum ina ting deve lopment of th is theme, see Joseph C. McLelland, Prome-
theus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism (Waterloo: W il frid La ur ier University Press, 1988). 
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Marx, humanity is now in competition with God. God, the relentless enemy of 
Prometheus, is the antihuman. To destroy this God constitutes a moral claim 
upon human beings, just as Prometheus knew and suffered for the death of 
Zeus that was to come if Prometheus remained faithful - a death devoutly to 
be wished. 
Ethics and the death of God merged in Friedrich Nietzsche in two ways. 
The death of God is already a cultural, even an epistemological, phenomenon: 
belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable.37 His death is not an event 
to come or to be worked, as with Marx, but an event which has already occurred; 
but, like the bursting of a great star billions of light-years away, its news has 
not yet reached human beings - though human beings have effected this death 
themselves. And how have human beings accomplished this? By their own 
cultural development, a development into the forms of knowledge and morality 
that Nietzsche's Gay Science traces through the first three books that build to 
the death of God. Human beings have developed from a growing set of percep-
tions and experiences, uncommon common sense about humanity (bk. 1), 
through advances in affectivity and art (bk. 2), to disciplined knowledge, logic, 
science, and morals - all of which lead inevitably to the death of God (bk. 3 ). 
Human development necessitates God's death . Moral courage demands that 
this death be acknowledged. 
One should emphasize that Nietzsche is not arguing an ontological 
change, but an epistemological one, something very close to the sociology of 
knowledge: Christian belief has become unbelievable. He is asserting what is 
incapable of human fai th any longer. Locke wished to establish which objects 
human understanding is capable of entertaining; Nietzsche determines which 
objects are capable of belief - and the Christian faith in God is not among 
them. One can no longer believe even in this belief. Unlike Marx, Nietzsche 
does not attempt to bring this death to pass, but to formulate a teaching to deal 
with its aftermath. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra celebrates Zarathustra as a moral teacher of a 
wisdom he is eager to give away. His teaching is to counter the nihilism that 
could issue out of the death of God. His premise is almost the exact opposite 
of Kant's conclusion: the ethical enterprise emerges in its shape and necessity 
from the cultural fact of the death of God: "I teach you the Overman."38 The 
37. Nietzsche's specification of the death of God is precise and nuanced and deserves 
to be cited as a corrective to its misunderstanding in popular usages: "Das groBte neuere 
Ereigniss, - daB 'Gott todt ist,' das der Glaube an den christlichen Gott unglaubwti rdig ist 
- beginnt bereits seine ersten Schatten tiber Europa zu werfen." See Friedrich Nietzsche, Die 
Frohliche Wissenshaft, V, no. 343, in Giorgio Colli and Massino Montinari, Nietzsche Werke, 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 255. 
38. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Viking Press, 1968), prologue, no. 3, p. 12 (punctuat ion slightly altered). 
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Overman becomes the new moral ideal. The position Prometheus held in the 
honor of Marx, the Overman holds in the moral aspirations of Nietzsche: the 
human must be overcome in the heroic progress to the Overman. The mission 
of Zarathustra takes its issue from this call of the heroic: "I shall show them the 
rainbow and all of the steps to the Overman."39 His instructions stood in 
contrast to the lessons of the "teachers of virtue" and their securing of con-
tagious sleep for humanity.40 
If the Overman is the great challenge to human history, the will to power 
is its basic moral energy: "A new will I teach men: to will this way which man 
has walked blindly, and to affirm it, and no longer to sneak away from it like 
the sick and decaying."41 The heroic will constituted the fundamental moral 
dynamism. "Alas , that you would understand my word: 'Do whatever you will, 
but first be such as are able to will.' "42 And the entire "On Old and New Tablets" 
builds in hymn to the sovereign will: "O thou my will! Thou cessation of all 
need, my own necessity! Keep me from all small victories! Thou destination of 
my soul, which I call destiny! Thou in-me! Over-me! Keep me and save me for 
a great destiny!"43 
But all of this is cast into ambiguity when the realization dawns that no 
victory or no achievement is final, tha_t there is no final overcoming. The return 
of all things and of all states is sempiternal. All victories are provisional. With 
a finite amount of matter in the universe and an eternal quantity of time, 
everything must reoccur endlessly- indeed had already endlessly reoccurred.44 
All of the past, even the "last man;' will return, and return endlessly. 45 The hope 
for something beyond the provisional only mirrors the efforts and the history 
of Sisyphus. This realization works a profound change in Zarathustra. He be-
comes the teacher of the eternal recurrence, and this intractable return of the 
same posed the fundamental challenge to the project to which he has given his 
life. The eternal return becomes the alternative to the creating God. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra must put the three together: the Overman, the 
will to power, and the eternal return. One becomes the Overman - realizes the 
possibilities of her or his humanity supremely- by willing absolutely the 
39. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, prologue, no. 9, p. 24; see no. 3, p. 12. 
40. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. I, no. 2, "On the Teachers of Virtue," pp. 
28-30. 
41. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. I, no. 3, "On the Afterworldly," p. 32. 
42. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. Ill, no. 5, "On Virtue That Makes Small," 
p. 172. 
43. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. III, no. 12, "On Old and New Tablets;' p. 214. 
44. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. Ill, no. 2, "On the Vision and the Riddle," 
pp. 155-56. 
45. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. III, no. 13, "The Convalescent;' pp. 217-20. 
Zarathustra is taught by the animals to accept and to proclaim the eternal return. 
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eternal return, by loving and accepting the eternal return.46 This radically re-
defines the heroic human being. He or she becomes a process of development, 
of advance toward the Overman. The finality of human nature is to become a 
bridge to the Overman, while the foundation of human nature is fundamentally 
the will to power. Human activity must be recognized in its possibilities and in 
its glory in these terms. 
Nietzsche can then move atheistic consciousness to a deeper level than 
Marx. What is God? The antihuman, the destruction of the entire heroic and 
humanistic project of Zarathustra and the progression of humanity to the Over-
man. God is the limit, the finitude of humanity. All of Zarathustra's doctrine 
pounds against God as against its absolute contradiction . "But let me reveal my 
heart to you entirely, my friends: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be 
a god! Hence there are no gods. Though I drew this conclusion, now it draws 
me."47 The human being and God: one is necessarily the refusal of the other. 
Lastly, human development is furthered by Sigmund Freud in a manner 
no less passionate than Friedrich Nietzsche's. Freud undertakes his treatment 
of religion and religious ideas in order to call his readers to advance beyond 
illusion into a world where affirmations are rationally grounded, through a 
process that he terms '" education to reality.' Need I confess to you that the sole 
purpose of my book is to point out the necessity for this forward step?"48 The 
removal of God, of this illusion, will throw human beings on their own re-
sources, as both Marx and Nietzsche also argued. Only then will one learn to 
make a proper use of human abilities. Atheism emerges in Freud's writings as 
a necessary condition for the Enlightenment's project of self-realization and 
self-reliance. The destruction of conviction about God is the beginning of 
authentic human freedom, though Freud's resultant ethics emerges much more 
stoic than that of his predecessors. For 
men are not entirely without assistance. Their scientific knowledge has taught 
them much since the days of the Deluge, and it will increase their power still 
further. And, as for the great necessities of Fate, against which there is no 
help, they will learn to endure them with resignation.49 
Like Nietzsche, Freud found in the advance of science the ext irpation of religion. 
Through a consideration of the origins and path of development, thought 
Freud, one can offer an assessment of the past and trace the emergence of God 
46. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z arath ustra, pt. III , no. 16, "The Seven Seals (Or: The Yes 
and Amen Song)," pp. 228-31. 
47. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z arathustra, pt. II, no. 2, "Upon the Blessed Isles," p. 86. 
48. Sigmund Freud, Th e Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: 
Norton , 1961), p. 49 (emphasis his). 
49. Freud , The Future of an Jllu sion, p. 50. 
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and religion as a mental asset for the self-protection of civilization. The basic 
force or drive behind any human development, even that of religious ideas, is 
the same: "The libido there follows the paths of narcissistic needs and attaches 
itself to the objects which ensure the satisfaction of those needs."50 To under-
stand the needs out of which religion has come, it is essential to recognize that 
parallel to the components of the total human personality - the superego, the 
ego, and the id - stands the corresponding and massive cultural triad that is 
civilization , the human person, and nature. These are lodged in continual hostil-
ity and threat - and their intractable struggle provides the context or horizon 
of intelligibility for the emergence of religion. Each component is mortally 
hostile to the others and must maintain its own integrity, influence, and control 
through continual dominance.51 Hostility, threat, struggle, and control - these 
character ize the context in which Freud examines religion. 
Within this structure of endless conflict, one asks about the psycholog-
ical significance of religious ideas. They are technically illusion; that is, beliefs 
not grounded in evidence but in wish fulfillment and formulated to handle 
the threats delivered by nature and by civilization.52 Seemingly promising, 
these illusions are ultimately destructive of human growth. Religion apes, as 
well as supports, civilization. Civilization is constituted by knowledge and 
regulations; religion, by beliefs and practices. Religion mirrors, as well as 
suggests, psychopathologies: as beliefs or illusion, religion corresponds to 
Meynert's amentia, a "state of acu te hallucinatory confusion"; and as practice, 
it can be seen as a universal obsessive neurosis - issuing out of the Oedipus 
complex.53 Religion is ersatz civilization, substituting for the knowledge and 
rationa l conduct of culture irrational beliefs and obsessive practices. When 
civi li zation is inadequate or when it falters, religion subsumes the three tasks 
of civilization against nature: human "self-regard, seriously menaced, call for 
consolation; life and the universe must be robbed of their terrors; moreover, 
human curios ity, moved, it is true, by the strongest practical interest, 
demands an answer."54 On the other hand, the beliefs and practices of religion 
can reconcile the human person to the instinctual renunciations demanded 
by civilization. 
The lengthy genesis of the idea of God can be traced from pre-animistic 
or magical stages, animistic stages, through totemism and polytheism to mono-
theism. For Freud also, the "death of God" occurs, but not as the Marxist project 
for the future or Nietzsche's epistemological fact in the recent past. This death 
50. Freud , Th e Future of an Jllusion, p. 24. 
5 1. Freud , The Fu ture of an Jllusion, chaps. 1-2, pp. 5-14. 
52. Freud, Th e Future of an Illusion, pp. 30-33. 
53 . Freud , The Future of an Illusion, p. 43 and n. 3. 
54. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 16. 
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occurs rather at the origins of religion - as the historical event of the killing 
and eating of the primeval father by the sons, the regret and fear that followed 
this event and the rules of totemism that arose as an attempt to ease the guilt 
and to appease the father. God emerges out of human history, rather than out 
of ethics (as with Kant) or out of human religious experience (as with Schleier-
macher). The death of God is not the terminus of belief, as with Nietzsche, but 
its origin. As he wrote in his study of Leonardo da Vinci: "Psycho-analysis has 
made us aware of the intimate connection between the father-complex and 
belief in God, and has taught us that the personal God is psychologically nothing 
other than a magnified father." 55 
God is not a neutral statement leveled at humanity. Religious ideas become 
destructive of the human, inhibiting responsibility and growth. "The whole 
thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly 
attitude to humanity, it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals 
will never be able to rise above this view of life."56 So profoundly does God 
inhibit human development that religion can be listed as the great enemy of 
science: "Of the three powers which may dispute the basic position of science, 
religion alone is to be taken seriously as an enemy."57 
What is the future of religious ideas, of God? Marginalization and extinc-
tion. There will be an increasing turning away from religion as human beings 
develop in their rationality, and to inhibit this disengagement would be to 
inhibit that human development. Gradually, painfully, the human intellect is 
coming into its own and breaking the bonds around it, placed and tightened 
by religion: "The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it 
has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. 
This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future 
of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance ... . The primacy 
of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but probably not in an 
infinitely distant one."58 The lines between the enlightened and the religious 
could not be more antagonistically drawn: rational and irrational, humane 
development and blind inhibitions, knowledge and belief, realistic and obsessive 
practice. 
55. Sigmund Freud, Leonard da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, trans. James 
Strachey (New York: Norton, n.d.), p. 103. See Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. 
Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage, 1939) , pt. III , sec. 1, pp. 102- 10. 
56. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discon tents, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New 
York: Norton, 1961 ), p. 21. 
57. Sigm und Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. and ed. James 
Strachey (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 160. 
58. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 53 (emphasis his). 
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V. A Reflection 
The apologetics of the early nineteenth century argued to the reality of God 
from human nature and its entailments: God makes possible human life in the 
fullest sense. The rising atheism of the later decades of that century also took 
the human as the point of departure, as the arena within which the struggle 
was to be conducted, and argued exactly to the opposite conclusion: God 
alienates humanity from itself and from its promise. 
This attack was conducted by a philosophical anthropology that moved 
through differing and at times overlapping levels in its analysis of the human 
being and of human development. Feuerbach saw the human being as sensuous 
self-consciousness, with this self-consciousness uniquely able to focus upon the 
human species; for Marx, this sensuous self-consciousness was both socially 
constituted in communal solidarity and called to engage in human life as 
revolutionary praxis; for Nietzsche, what lay beneath all praxis, however revo-
lutionary, was the human being as the dynamism of the will to power, the bridge 
to the Overman and heroic human transcendence; for Freud, the human being 
was psychologically constituted even in the eros of its self-affirmation and life 
by its collective and personal history, and by the inner struggles of its psychic 
components and its development, identified with progress, toward scientific 
rationality. 
For all of these, God loomed as the great enemy. For Feuerbach, belief in 
God fixed the human essence outside of itself; for Marx, it alienated the human 
person from the practical, revolutionary activity by which alone praxis could 
achieve freedom; for Nietzsche, God was the external finitude of the Overman 
as something which would always transcend and so limit in frustration the 
Overman; for Freud, belief in God was the permanent infantilization of the 
human being. 
What actually happened to the understanding of God under this massive 
rise of atheism in the nineteenth century? Much more occurred than the con-
ception of God as a projection of the human, a grammatical realization that 
theology was really anthropology. Something much darker and more destructive 
had been discovered in the divine. One can take a leaf from another book to 
address this question. 
When Ignatius of Loyola in his Spiritual Exercises wanted to name the 
diabolical, to specify what Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Ivan called "the spirit of self-
destruction and non-existence," he did not use the term "Satan;' and only rarely 
the name "Lucifer."59 He spoke repeatedly of "el enemigo de natura humana" 
59. For "Lucifer," see the "Meditaci6n de dos Banderas," in the Spiritual Exercises, 
Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, Monumenta Ignatiana, ser. II, vol. 1, Exercitia Spiritualia, 
ed. Josephus Calveras and Candidus de Dalmases (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis 
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- the enemy of human nature.60 The profound insight into the diabolical 
carried by this designation resumes a great deal of scriptural tradition and bears 
very much upon the dialectics of the nineteenth century: the diabolical is the 
destructively antihuman. Nietzsche perceptively saw this conclusion implicit in 
the commitments of Continental atheism: 
Theologically speaking - listen closely, for I rarely speak as a theologian -
it was God himself who at the end of his days' work lay down as a serpent 
under the tree of knowledge: thus he recuperated from being God. - He had 
made everything too beautiful. - The devil is merely the leisure of God on 
that seventh day.61 
This emerges as the final and devastating judgment upon all religious 
reality: God is the alienation of humanity from its own essence, from its social 
freedom, from its dynamic possibilities, from its mature self-responsibility and 
growth. God is the enemy of humanity. This is the unique conclusion of the 
atheism whose rise one can trace in the nineteenth century. It can subsequently 
assume even the experiences that go with the "religious," with all of its sense of 
integrity and dedication, so long as with John Dewey one will separate "the 
religious" from the concept of God, dismissing the latter as fundamentally 
incredible to the cultivated.62 This judgment- that underneath the mask of 
God one finds not so much the visage of the human as the face of Satan - is 
perhaps the most radical change in religious understanding in the history of 
religious belief. The divine has been turned into the diabolical. God has been 
transformed into Satan. 
Iesu, 1969), nos. 136, 137, and 138. For Dostoyevsky, see "The Grand Inquisitor;' pt. 2, bk. 
5, chap. 5 of The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David Magarshack (Baltimore: Penguin, 1958), 
vol. I, p. 295. 
60. Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, nos. 7, 10, 135, 325, 326, 327, 334; see also 
enemigo, nos. 8, 12,217,274,314, 320,325,329, 347, 349, 350. 
61. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," in Ecce Homo, trans. and ed. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), p. 311. 
62. See the proposals of John Dewey in A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1934). 
